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A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO COUNSEL AND THE AMERICAN INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
NICHOLAS A. LUTZ*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .
to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."' Whether this brief clause imposes an affirmative duty
on courts to provide counsel for those who could not otherwise afford it was
historically less axiomatic than it is today. The modem understanding that the
criminally accused must be appointed counsel when unable to afford a private
attorney is based primarily on the landmark Supreme Court decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright2 and its legal progeny. Gideon declared "that in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 3
Gideon clearly established that the right to counsel is fundamental to
ensuring just criminal proceedings, 4 and insisted that no criminal defendant be
forced to face prosecution without the assistance of a competent lawyer. Today,
however, the American legal system is systematically failing to provide the
indigent criminally accused with the type of representation required by Gideon and
the Constitution. America is facing an indigent defense crisis. Legal, social, and
political practicalities have combined to create a seemingly insurmountable barrier
to the real enforcement of the Sixth Amendment rights of the criminally accused.
The indigent counsel crisis presents a unique and troubling question: what must be
done when the nature of the legal system itself proves to defeat a constitutional
maxim?
This article traces the development of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
leading to the recognition of the right to appointed counsel in criminal
proceedings.' It then reviews the apparent state of crisis in which that right goes

* J.D. Candidate May 2017, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Jose R. (Beto) Juarez for his guidance in developing the focus of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).
3. Id. at 344.
4. Id; see Justin F. Marceau, Embracing A New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161 (2012) (providing an extensive examination of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's application to non-trial oriented and non-truth seeking
procedural protections).
5. See Randy M. Sutton, Annotation, Construction and Application ofSixth Amendment Right to
Counsel-Supreme CourtCases, 33 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2009).
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largely unrecognized for indigent criminal defendants. Next it proposes that the
solution to the crisis may lie in the increased use of structural injunctions and
argues that the recent Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata6 has opened the
door for state and federal courts to impose unprecedentedly expansive affirmative
demands upon state and local governments in order to reform constitutionally
defective indigent defense systems. Finally, it examines recent federal district
court decisions with opposing implications for the future viability of the structural
injunction approach to remedying Sixth Amendment violations.
II.

THE SCOTTSBORO Boys: POWELL V. ALABAMA EXPANDS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT TO COUNSEL

In Powell v. Alabama,' the Supreme Court recognized for the first time
that state courts had a constitutional duty to appoint counsel to certain criminal
defendants who could not otherwise acquire representation. Powell involved the
alleged rape of two white women on a freight train in route from Chattanooga to
Memphis, Tennessee.' In what became a highly racialized public spectacle, a
group of black men between thirteen and twenty years old, who had also been
passengers on the train, were arrested in connection with the crime. By the end of
the same day, local residents had formed a lynch mob outside the station where the
men were held.10 As the United States Supreme Court would later describe the
prosecution:
The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile
sentiment, haled back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an
atrocious crime regarded with especial horror in the community where
they were to be tried, were thus put in peril of their lives within a few
moments after counsel for the first time charged with any degree of
1
responsibility began to represent them.

The "counsel" Justice Sutherland alludes to above refers to the trial court's dubious
appointment of "all of the members of the bar for the purpose of arraigning the
defendants and to help if no counsel appear[ed]." 12 While a local lawyer and an
interested out-of-state lawyer appeared the day of trial, both merely indicated a
willingness to assist court appointed counsel, though no such appointment was
ever made.1 3 Each of the defendants was found guilty after a one-day trial and
sentenced to death. 14

6. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 45 (1932).
8. Michael J. Klarman, Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379, 379 (2009).

9. Id
10. Id
11.
12.
13.
14.

Powell, 287 U.S. at 57-58.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 57-58.
Id at 50.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court confined its examination to whether the
trial court's failure to effectively appoint counsel was a violation of the defendants'
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15
Because Powell was decided during the pre-incorporation era, the text of the Sixth
Amendment informed the analysis, but could not control on the issue of whether or
not the Powell defendants were entitled to counsel in a state court.1 6 Rather, the
analysis turned on whether the accuseds' right to counsel in a criminal trial was "of
such a nature that [it was] included in the conception of due process of law"
encapsulated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 17
The Court reasoned that the concept of a fair hearing was a "basic
element[] of the constitutional requirement of due process of law," as presupposed
in the American legal system as the requirement that the court have jurisdiction
over the cases it hears." Further, inherent in the concept of a fair hearing was the
right to the assistance of counsel.19 Therefore, in many circumstances, the denial of
counsel effectively amounts to an absolute denial of a hearing, and thus violates
the Due Process Clause. The Powell Court elaborated on the practical unfairness
that confronts an unrepresented defendant in a criminal proceeding as further
justification for the right's inclusion in the concept of due process of law:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
20
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
The Court held that the Powell defendants had not been accorded their right to a
fair trial in accordance with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 1

15. Id. at 61.
16. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court's Searchfor Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303, 355 (2001).
17. Powell, 287 U.S. 45 at 67-68 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908))
(internal quotations omitted)).
18. Id. at 68.
19. Id at 66
20. Id at 69.
21. In order to reach the majority's holding in Powell, the court carefully distinguished Hurtado v.
California, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment's requirement that convictions
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As was typical of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment due process rulings
in the criminal procedure context during the pre-incorporation era,2 2 Powell was
decided on narrow and fact-intensive rationale. Despite the Court's language
explaining in clear terms the unfairness that confronts any unrepresented criminal
defendant (including, of course, "the intelligent and educated layman") in the
context of any criminal prosecution, the Powell decision was limited to capital
cases in which the defendant was unable to retain counsel, and unable to provide
his or her own defense due to a limitation such as "ignorance, feeble-mindedness,
illiteracy, or the like." 2 3 While Powell represents a judicial recognition of the
fundamental nature of the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants, it is
also illustrative of the limitations imposed by the pre-incorporation case-by-case
approach to due process rights in the realm of criminal procedure. Full affirmation
of the right to appointed counsel would require the eventual abandonment of the
substantive due process approach.
III. ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK: BETTS V. BRADY RETRACTS THE
SCOPE OF POWELL V. ALABAMA

Only a decade after the Court's decision in Powell, the Court made clear
the limited nature of the decision's holding. In Betts v. Brady,2 4 the Court
considered the case of Smith Betts, an indigent defendant who was unable to hire a
lawyer, denied appointed counsel, and ultimately convicted of robbery. 25 Betts

based on violations of capital or otherwise infamous crimes be preceded by a grand jury indictment was
inapplicable to state courts. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
Hurtado 's rationale was that because the grand jury requirement was included in the language
of the Fifth Amendment, but not in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, that language could not
have been intended to apply to the states, and thus applied to the federal government alone. Id That
rationale could logically have been extended to the Sixth Amendment, mandating a decision that
inclusion of the right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment, and the lack of that language in the
Fourteenth Amendment, precluded the right to counsel from being applied to the states as a due process
right. The Powell Court relied on Chicago, Burlington & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1987),
which held that uncompensated takings were precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause, despite being explicitly addressed by the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Powell, 287 U.S. 45
at 66. The Court also cited Gitlow v. People ofState ofNew York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), which held
that the First Amendment freedom of speech and of the press are encompassed within the fundamental
rights protected by the due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment, and precluded from state
infringement regardless of their explicit inclusion in the First Amendment. Id at 67. The Court
additionally cited Stromberg v. People of the State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931), and Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931), which reaffirmed the inclusion of First Amendment speech rights
in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Hurtado, the Court ruled, is merely "an aid to
construction ... it must yield to more compelling considerations whenever such considerations exist."

Id
22. Israel, supra note 15 at 354 ("The primary example of due process rulings stressing the
circumstances of the particular case were those involving claims based upon the failure to provide
counsel to assist indigent defendants") (footnote omitted).
23. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
24. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
25. Id. at 457.
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argued that based on numerous precedents following the Powell decision, the
Supreme Court had laid the foundation for a ruling that the right to appointed
counsel applied to every criminal defendant unable to obtain a lawyer.26 The Court
acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment required the appointment of counsel for
defendants who were otherwise unable to procure an attorney in federal criminal
prosecutions.27 Whether or not it applied to the states depended on whether it was
fundamental to due process of law, a question which Powell answered in the
affirmative. 28 After a searching review of colonial and early state constitutional
provisions addressing the right to counsel at trial, the Betts Court determined that
the inconsistent treatment of the matter across jurisdictions mandated the
conclusion that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial." 29 States were not obligated to provide counsel in every criminal
prosecution.3 However, the Court did acknowledge that denial of counsel in a
particular case might result in a fundamentally unfair conviction.31 This was not
the case the for Smith Betts, and the Court affirmed the denial of his petition of
habeas corpus.32

IV.

GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPOINTED
COUNSEL IS EXPLICITLY APPLIED TO THE STATES

On June 3, 1961, there was a break-in at the Bay Harbor Poolroom in
Panama City, Florida at about 5:30 a.m. 33 Clarence Earl Gideon, "a fifty-one-yearold white man who had been in and out of prisons much of his life,"34 was charged
with "breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny." 35 Prior to trial,
Gideon requested the assistance of counsel based on his constitutional
entitlement(in a somewhat famous and bizarrely prescient colloquy with court):
The
The
The
The
The
was
The

Court: What says the Defendant? Are you ready to go to trial?
Defendant: I am not ready, your Honor.
Court: Why aren't you ready?
Defendant: I have no Counsel.
Court: Why do you not have Counsel? Did you not know your case
set for trial today?
Defendant: Yes, sir, I knew that it was set for trial today.

26. Id at 462.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id at 464-65 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
Powell, 287 U.S. at 73.
Betts, 316 U.S. at 471.
Id at 471-72.
Id at 473.
Id.

33. Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON L.

REV. 181, 200 (2003).
34. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 5 (1964).
35. Jacob, supra note 32, at 200.
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The Court: Why, then, did you not secure Counsel and be prepared to go
to trial?
The Defendant: Your Honor I request this Court to appoint Counsel to
represent me in this trial.
The Court: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to
represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the
only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is
when that person is charged with a capital offense.
The Defendant: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to
36
be represented by Counsel.

Gideon's request for appointed counsel was denied, he was convicted, and
ultimately sentenced to five years in a state prison.37 Proceeding pro se, Gideon
filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging his conviction based on the trial
court's denial of his request for appointed counsel. 38 The Supreme Court of Florida
denied his petition without a written opinion, 39 but the U.S. Supreme Court granted
Gideon's petition for writ of certiorari.40
The Gideon Court recognized that Betts rested entirely on the conclusion
that the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants was not so fundamental
to a fair trial that it fell within the sphere of protection of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 However, a number of decisions in the decade or
so preceding Betts, including Powell v. Alabama, had affirmed the fundamental
character of the right to counsel.42 Those affirmations, the Court reasoned, were no
less valid because the decisions themselves were limited to the facts of their
respective cases.43 Though none of those precedents declared the affirmative duty
of a court to appoint defense counsel where the accused could not otherwise afford
it, the Betts decision was still an aberration in its declaration that the right to
counsel was not fundamental.44 Stressing the paramount role of the assistance of
counsel in ensuring the fairness of American courts, the Court held:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both
state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish

36. Id at 200-01
37. Id at 212.

38. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).
39. Gideon v. Cochran., 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961), rev'dsub nom. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

40. Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908, 908 (1962).
41. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340.
42. Id at 342-43.
43. Id. at 343.
44. Id. at 343-44.
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machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an
orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in
some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and
national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural
and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to
45
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.

The Court "concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first
eight amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action
by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them
[is] the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal
prosecution." 4 6 The Court explicitly overruled Betts, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
Gideon's legacy was born. 47
V.

THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS AND THE REALITY OF GIDEON

Despite the clarity of Gideon's holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires that even impoverished defendants be afforded the assistance of counsel,
the right to appointed counsel today is more aspirational than actualized.
According to the American Bar Association, "indigent defense in the United States
remains in a state of crisis." 48 The United States Department of Justice has
concluded that America's indigent defense systems routinely fail to meet the
49
constitutionally mandated level of representation required by Gideon.

45. Id. at 344.
46. Id. at 343 (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936)).
47. Id. at 345.
48. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N.,
BROKEN
PROMISE:
AMERICA'S
CONTINUING
QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE 38

GIDEON'S

(2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aid indigent defendants/Is_
sclaid def bp right to counsel in criminalproceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter GIDEON' S
BROKEN PROMISE].

49. In its memorandum of accomplishments, the United States Department of Justice's Office for
Access to Justice summarized the state of indigent defense in America succinctly: "In the criminal
justice system, public defender offices are underfunded and understaffed, often so severely that they
cannot hope to provide their clients with effective representation. Indigent defender annual caseloads
can range from 500 to 900 felony cases and over 2,000 misdemeanors, at least five to six times the
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Examination of the various indigent defense systems across the country reveals
that the majority of systems are woefully underfunded, lack oversight and
accountability, and persistently result in the violation of defendants' constitutional
rights. Indigent defenders are underpaid, poorly trained, extraordinarily
overworked, unable to adequately investigate or research their cases, impaired by
conflicts of interest, overly reliant on plea agreements, and lacking in other
practice-essential resources.o Their clients are persistently left without adequate
representation, and they often cannot avoid violating their professional and ethical
duties."
However, the indigent defense crisis is not a new phenomenon. "In fact,
since the 1963 Gideon decision, a major independent report has been issued at least
every five years documenting the severe deficiencies in indigent defense
services.... The claim that indigent defense sorely needs reform is neither novel
nor controversial." 5 2 Critics have discussed the disparity between Gideon 's
promise and the realities of indigent defense with the same sense of urgency and
moral outrage displayed by today's commentators for some time.5 3 However, the
problem's persistence is not an indication of triviality, but rather a sign of the truly
deep entrenchment of its causes, and its resistance to political reform.
VI. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REMEDY: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AND STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON

To begin to address the inadequacies of representation provided by
indigent defense services, the most obvious avenue is probably direct appeal or
post-conviction challenges asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The
principle that the right to counsel encompasses the right to effective counsel is so
straightforward that it is given very little explicit attention in the early cases and is
generally treated as being intertwined with the right to counsel itself .4 Later cases
acknowledged that incompetent or otherwise ineffective assistance of counsel may
recommended ceilings set by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice. In some
instances, jurisdictions have reported case load assignments to be so high that defenders average just
seven minutes per case. Understaffing leads to lack of attention to individual clients' cases, which in
turn can lead to grave injustice, including wrongful convictions and unjust imprisonment." OFFICE FOR
ACCESS

TO

JUSTICE

OF

THE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

U.S.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE:

FOUR

YEAR

ANNIVERSARY
(2010),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atj/legacy/2014/03/14/accomplishments.pdf.
50. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 47, at 38-41.
51. Id.
52. Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for LitigatedReform of Indigent Defense, 113
HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2064-65 (2000).
53. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 627 (1986).
54. For example, in Powell, one of the bases on which the Court decided that the defendants had
been denied their due process rights was that the representation administered by the court was more
"pro forma than zealous and active. "Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); See also Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) ("The effective assistance of counsel in such a case is a constitutional
requirement of due process which no member of the Union may disregard." (emphasis added)).

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol7/iss1/5

8

Lutz: A Right to a Remedy: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and the

2017

A

RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY

111

violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel but did not, however,
elaborate on a threshold level of representation sufficient to satisfy the right."
The seemingly glaring absence of a constitutional standard for the
effective assistance of counsel was addressed by the Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington.5 6 The Court in Strickland explained the test for ineffective
assistance of counsel as "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result." 5 7 Under Strickland, to demonstrate that counsel's
representation was sufficiently defective to warrant post-conviction relief, the
defendant must demonstrate (1) that counsel committed serious errors in the course
of the representation of the defendant, and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by
those errors.5 s As to the first prong, the Court announced an objective test requiring
a showing that counsel's performance was unreasonable in light of the prevailing
norms of the legal profession. 59 The second prong then requires a defendant
demonstrate that but for his or her counsel's unreasonably deficient performance
there is a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have resulted in a
different outcome.60
The holding in Strickland has been heavily criticized on number of
grounds. Perhaps most compellingly, many commentators argue that the Court
misconstrued the Sixth Amendment's function in that it merely serves to ensure
that trials result in just outcomes, and does not protect the accused's procedural
right to counsel in an absolute sense.61 This outcome centered approach, it has been
argued, "suggests that the end justifies the means in the precise circumstance
where the legitimacy of the end is dependent on the legitimacy of the means....
[O]ne cannot know the 'correct' result without first allowing the process to operate
properly."62 Critics have also asserted the inappropriateness of the requirement that
a defendant make an affirmative showing of prejudice based on the likelihood that
it will often be nearly, if not actually, impossible for a defendant to prove that a

55. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("[D]efendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel. Beyond this we think the matter,
for the most part, should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition
that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.") (footnote
omitted).
56. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
57. Id at 686.
58. Id at 687.
59. Id at 688.
60. Id at 694.
61. See Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standardfor Claims of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259,
1266 (1986).
62. Id
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different result would have ensued but for counsel's error, especially where a jury
verdict is at issue.63
Whatever else may be said about the legal reasoning underlying
Strickland (and much more might be said), it is clear that the standard places an
incredibly high burden on defendants pursuing ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. The decision's clear implication is that even where representation is
systemically defective, very few convictions are likely to be overturned based on
the ineffective assistance of counsel. With Strickland as the operative standard,
appeals and collateral actions challenging convictions based on the inadequacy of
appointed counsel are unlikely to have any reformative effect on inadequate
indigent defense systems. Successful post-conviction challenges are simply
unlikely to ever be so numerous or burdensome that they impede the function of
the courts to a degree that might garner the attention of policy makers.
Nevertheless, some cases have attempted to incorporate ineffective
assistance of counsel claims with systemic challenges to indigent defense systems,
arguing that the dysfunction of the public defender systems caused de facto
ineffective assistance for defendants represented by those systems. In at least three
such cases, the respective courts agreed that the indigent defense systems at issue
were sufficiently defective to justify an inference or even legal presumption that
the systems' clients received ineffective assistance.64 The judicial recognition that
the indigent defense systems at issue were constitutionally defective as a whole is a
tremendous first step toward fixing those systems. However, because those cases
were criminal appeals of individual convictions, any potential remedies applied
only to the particular defendants. Even where a presumption of inadequate counsel
applies, defendants are still haled into court, tried, and convicted in violation of
their rights. Post-conviction criminal remedies cannot eliminate the underlying
violations. Remedies based in criminal procedure, by themselves, are simply not
capable of working the systemic change needed to address the indigent defense
crisis.
VII. THE LEGISLATIVE REMEDY

Many commentators, including the American Bar Association, have urged
that inadequate indigent defense systems can be cured through a combination of
legislative changes and voluntary efforts on the part of non-state actors like the
various national, state, and local bar associations. 61 It is true that the indigent
63. Id. at 1281 ("Proof of a reasonable probability that the result would have been different is
virtually impossible since jurors' decisions are based on an infinite variety of subjective data, and one
can rarely, if ever, state that it is reasonably probable that a jury would have reached a different result
than it did.").
64. Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 51, at 2069 ("[T]he high courts of Arizona,
Louisiana, and Oklahoma have all found their state indigent defense systems constitutionally
deficient.") (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Peart, 621
So.2d 780 (La. 1993); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990)).
65. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 47, at 38-41.
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defense crisis might be solved through the political process. However, despite the
opportunity provided by the better part of a century, we have yet to see any such
meaningful national reform take shape. The political branches may have the
capacity to solve the indigent defense crisis, but the persistence of the problem
indicates that they apparently do not have the will. After all, as a group, the
indigent criminally accused have minimal political clout,6 6 and indigent defense
systems must compete for resources with other, more politically palatable causes.6
Where political expediency encourages eschewing the issue, and where "current
constitutional law . . . leaves legislatures free to underfund indigent defense,"6 8 a
political solution seems improbable. That being the case, advocates should
necessarily focus on the development of a legal strategy.
VIII. THE MOST DRASTIC AND MOST APPROPRIATE REMEDY: REFORM
THROUGH RESURGENCE OF THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION

As several scholars have argued, the unique characteristics of the indigent
defense crisis make it an ideal candidate for reform through the use of structural
injunctions. A structural injunction, "in addition to enjoining the defendant
institution from acting in a particular unconstitutional fashion, order[s] forwardlooking, affirmative steps to prevent future deprivations."6 9 This immensely
powerful judicial tool has its origins in the seminal public school desegregation
cases of the 1950s.7 0 Structural injunctions gained some prominence throughout
the 1970s as an instrument of reform in the contexts of prison administration,
public housing, and mental health care,7 1 though the use of the remedy is generally
considered to have faded since that time.7 Because the indigent defense crisis is
both unsuited to resolution through post-conviction procedural remedies, and is
unlikely to be cured by the political process, attack through structural injunction

66. Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 51, at 2067-68 ("Criminal defendants comprise a
political constituency with little, if any, leverage; indeed, many felony convicts are formally
disenfranchised. Public choice theory clearly predicts, and experience demonstrates, that indigent
defense will be undersupported." (footnote omitted)).
67. See Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem ofPolitical Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2700
(2013) ("Although the need for greater resources for indigent defense services may be obvious, it is
here that political will falters most, for equally obvious reasons. With clamoring demand for dwindling
public funds for schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, public transportation, firefighters, and police
officers, it is not surprising that more money for lawyers representing alleged criminals is not high on
anyone's list. Generating the will to provide these crucial resources is an enormous challenge.").
68. Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 904 (2013).
69. Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the StructuralReform Injunction: Gops . . It's Still Moving!,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 144 (2003).
70. Id. at 172 n.2. ("The birth of the modem structural reform injunction can be traced to Brown
v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), which directed the district courts to implement the
right to a non-segregated education. ").
71. 9 WEST'S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 11255 (2016).
72. Gilles, supra note 68, at 145 ("There are no contemporary examples of bold, Brown-like
reformist judicial enterprises.").
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may well represent the only remaining method for effecting Gideon's now halfcentury old promise.
A handful of cases filed in multiple jurisdictions in recent years indicate
that the structural injunction has not escaped the notice of indigent defense reform
advocates. These cases, generally brought against states and municipalities and
claiming affirmative injunctive relief based on Sixth Amendment violations,
present a highly perplexing question: what legal standard applies to claims of
denials of substantive Sixth Amendment rights? Should entitlement to injunctive
relief be governed by the generally accepted standard for awarding injunctive
relief, or should plaintiffs be additionally required to meet the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard established by Strickland? The distinction between
these alternatives is immensely important in determining the viability of the
structural injunction approach.73 If courts require that plaintiffs meet Strickland's
requirements, then plaintiffs will be barred from bringing suits based on any preconviction Sixth Amendment violation, as no "outcome" will exist to allow
analysis of Strickland's prejudice prong.7 4 Additionally, where plaintiffs proceed
with post-conviction civil actions for structural injunction, Strickland's incredibly
burdensome standards might significantly limit the number of potentially
successful actions, as many plaintiffs will simply be unable to demonstrate either
serious error or substantial prejudice.
While it seems clear that civil claims based on Sixth Amendment
violations should not require plaintiffs to meet the Strickland test for ineffective
representation,7 5 precisely what the alternative is remains unclear. Where
73. For an extensive review of the various standards applied by the courts reviewing Sixth
Amendment challenges to defective public defense systems, see Emily Chiang, Indigent Defense
Invigorated:A Uniform Standardfor Adjudicating Pre-ConvictionSixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 462 (2010).
74. See, e.g., Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("Here, Platt seeks to enjoin
the Marion County public defender system because it effectively denies indigents the effective
assistance of counsel. However, a violation of a Sixth Amendment right will arise only after a defendant
has shown he was prejudiced by an unfair trial. This prejudice is essential to a viable Sixth Amendment
claim and will exhibit itself only upon a showing that the outcome of the proceeding was unreliable. Id.
Accordingly, the claims presented here are not reviewable under the Sixth Amendment as we have no
proceeding and outcome from which to base our analysis.")(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); Chiang,
supra note 72, at 462 (arguing "the lesson of Platt is that unless the court understands that Strickland is
wholly inapplicable to pre-conviction claims, plaintiffs with even the most egregious of Sixth
Amendment rights violations will see their claims fail.").
75. See New York Cty. Law. Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding
that a Sixth Amendment "claim of ineffectiveness is ultimately concerned with the fairness of the
process as a whole rather than its particular impact on the outcome of the case and therefore this court
finds the more taxing two-prong Strickland standard used to vacate criminal convictions inappropriate
in a civil action that seeks prospective relief.") (citing New York Cty. Law. Ass'n v. State, 745
N.Y.S.2d 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)) (internal quotations omitted). See also Hurrell-Harring v. State,
930 N.E.2d 217, 225 (N.Y. 2010) ("Collateral preconviction claims seeking prospective relief for
absolute, core denials of the right to the assistance of counsel cannot be understood to be incompatible
with Strickland These are not the sort of contextually sensitive claims that are typically involved when
ineffectiveness is alleged. The basic, unadorned question presented by such claims where, as here, the
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Strickland has been held not to apply, courts have applied the general standard for
entitlement to injunctive relief in which the plaintiff(s) must demonstrate "the
likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of
remedies at law."7 6 While the uncertainty underlying the injunctive relief standard
is problematic for developing a systemic Sixth Amendment violation litigation
model, if these claims continue to be brought, a clearer test will undoubtedly
emerge. Whatever the precise contours of the eventual test, a recent Supreme Court
decision confirms that where it is met, the nature and scope of the affirmative
equitable remedies that a court may permissibly impose on government is vaster
than ever before.7 7

IX.

BROWN V. PLATA AND EXPANSION OF THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION

In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Plata, a consolidated case
arising from two class action suits alleging overcrowding and inadequate medical
care in California prisons in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.78
In the first of the underlying cases, Coleman v. Wilson,79 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California found that California's prison system
was responsible for systemic violations of mentally ill state prisoners' Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 0 Upon that
finding, the court ordered the state prison administrator:
[T]o develop and implement a series of forms, protocols, and plans in
consultation with court-appointed experts.... [And] also recommended
appointment of a special master for a period of three years to (1) consult
with the court concerning the appointment of experts; (2) monitor
compliance with court-ordered injunctive relief; (3) report to the court in
twelve months on the adequacy of suicide prevention; and (4) perform
such additional tasks as the court may deem necessary.

The second of the underlying cases involved similar Eighth Amendment claims
based on systemically deficient medical care in California's prisons.82 The
Defendants
admitted
that California's
prison medical
system was
unconstitutionally defective and "stipulated to a remedial injunction. The State
defendant-claimants are poor, is whether the State has met its obligation to provide counsel, not whether
under all the circumstances counsel's performance was inadequate or prejudicial."); Luckey v. Harris,
860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that Strickland is "inappropriate for a civil suit seeking
prospective relief. The sixth amendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus,
deficiencies that do not meet the 'ineffectiveness' standard may nonetheless violate a defendant's rights
under the sixth amendment.").
76. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974).
77. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
78. Id
79. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
80. Id at 1297.
81. Id
82. Brown, 563 U.S. at 510-11.
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failed to comply with that injunction, and in 2005 the court appointed a Receiver to
oversee remedial efforts." 8 3 After nearly a decade of judicial oversight, the
plaintiffs in both Coleman and Plata concluded that the ongoing violations of
prisoners' constitutional rights would not be remedied without a significant
reduction in the overall prison population.8 4 The plaintiffs in both cases moved to
convene a three judge panel which, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA"), 5 had the authority to order the State to reduce the prison population.86
After a two week trial, the three-judge panel ordered that California "reduce its
prison population to 137.5% of the prisons' design capacity within two years."8
That order would require the release of 46,000 California state prisoners.88 The
state appealed the order of the three-judge panel to the U.S. Supreme Court.8 9
At the outset of the majority opinion in Brown, Justice Kennedy
acknowledges the sheer magnitude of the remedy granted by the three-judge panel,
noting its "unprecedented sweep and extent." 90 However, Justice Kennedy
reasoned, while courts must be deferential to the administrative arms of the state,
courts must also abide by their obligation to enforce the constitutional rights of all
persons. 91 That obligation is not less compelling merely "because a remedy would
involve an intrusion into the realm of prison administration." 92
Under the PLRA, before implementing a prisoner release, the three-judge
panel must have determined "that the relief [was] narrowly drawn, extend[ed] no
further than necessary, and [was] the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right." 9 3 After reviewing the extensive remedial efforts
undertaken by the District Court in both Coleman and Plata, the Court found that
"the District Courts were not required to wait to see whether their more recent
efforts would yield equal disappointment." 9 4 The Court found that the release order
was not impermissibly broad because it might encompass prisoners who were not
among the class of plaintiffs suing.9 5 Nor did the Court find the release order
overbroad because it "encompass[ed] the entire prison system, rather than
separately assessing the need for a population limit at every institution," 9 6 or

83. Id at 507.
84. Id at 509.
85. The PLRA provides in relevant part that "In any civil action in Federal court with respect to
prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge court." 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a)(3)(B) (2012).
86. Brown, 563 U.S. at 508-11.
87. Id at 509-10.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id at 501.
91. Id. at 510-11.
92. Id at 511.
93. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(3)(E)).
94. Id at 516.
95. Id. at 531-32.
96. Id at 532.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol7/iss1/5

14

Lutz: A Right to a Remedy: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and the

A

2017

RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY

117

because it intruded on the State's authority to administer its prisons.9 7 Finally, the
State had not proposed any reasonable alternative to the release order, and decades
of remedial effort had failed to produce one.98 As Justice Kennedy explained:
The State's desire to avoid a population limit, justified as according
respect to state authority, creates a certain and unacceptable risk of
continuing violations of the rights of sick and mentally ill prisoners,
with the result that many more will die or needlessly suffer. The
Constitution does not permit this wrong.99
The Court elaborated on the scope of courts' authority to craft affirmative
injunctive remedies generally. "Once invoked, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers . . . is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies" (though in this case, the PLRA required narrow tailoring). 100 Courts
additionally retain broad and flexible authority to supervise remedial orders and
make necessary modifications. 101 A court may "invoke[] equity's power to remedy
a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an
institution [and] has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy
and consequences of its order." 10 2 While the Court reasoned that the state and its
administrative entities deserved at least some deference, it ruled that there was
nothing in the three-judge panel's order that was violative of either the district
court's equitable authority, or the specific limitations imposed by the PLRA. 103
Justice Kennedy's opinion concludes, the "extensive and ongoing constitutional
violation requires a remedy, and a remedy will not be achieved without a reduction
in overcrowding. The relief ordered by the three-judge court is required by the
Constitution and was authorized by Congress in the PLRA. The State shall
1 04
implement the order without further delay."
The decision in Brown was accompanied by immense critical backlash. 0
The general tone of the criticism is well-encapsulated by Justice Scalia's blistering
dissent, which begins by describing the majority's holding as "perhaps the most
radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation's history," and "a judicial
travesty" that "ignores bedrock limitations on the power of Article III judges, and
1 06
takes federal courts wildly beyond their institutional capacity."

97. Id at 533.
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id at 538 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 n.9 (1978)).
101. Id at 1946.
102. Id (citing New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
103. Id
104. Id at 545.
105. See id at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Id
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Citing his own concurrence in Mine Workers v. Bagwell,1 0 7 Justice Scalia
outlined the origins of the structural injunction and concluded that historically,
equitable remedies such as injunctions could not require any ongoing court
supervision of a litigant's conduct. 10 Injunctions were traditionally limited to the
requirement of no more than a "single simple act." 109 Thus, the ongoing
administrative supervision required by many structural injunctions is simply an
impermissible adulteration of an otherwise legitimate and long-established
equitable remedy.110 Additionally, structural reform litigation, Justice Scalia
argued, has the unavoidable consequence of usurping the policy choices of the
branches they legitimately belong to and replacing them with that of unelected
judges. 1
The most significant aspect of Justice Scalia's dissent in Brown is his
conclusion that the decision "not only affirms the structural injunction but vastly
expands its use, by holding that an entire system is unconstitutional because it may
produce constitutional violations."1 1 2 Other commentators have similarly
concluded that Brown represents a watershed moment for the structural injunction,
and very likely signals its potentially burgeoning use as a tool for systemic civil
rights reform.1 1 3 If the vast structural injunction at issue in Brown can be upheld
even in spite of the extreme limitations, such as the narrow tailoring requirement
imposed by the PLRA, then it is difficult to imagine what, if any, affirmative
injunctive orders would be impermissibly overbroad when aimed at addressing
systemic rights violations like that at issue in Brown.
X.

PERFECT PARALLELS: THE LEGAL RATIONALE OF BROWN V. PLA TA AS
APPLIED TO THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS

The structural obstacles underlying the persistence of the constitutional
violations at issue in Brown v. Plata are markedly similar to those underlying the
entrenchment of unconstitutionally defective indigent defense services. The Court

107. International Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 841-42 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).

108. Id
109. Id at 841 (citing H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
110. Id at 842-43.

§ 15, at 32-33

(2d ed. 1948)).

111. Brown, 569 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 555.
113. See Alicia Bower, UnconstitutionallyCrowded: Brown v. Plata and How the Supreme Court
PushedBack to Keep Prison Reform Litigation Alive, 45 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 555, 567 (2012) ("With
Brown v. Plata, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld perhaps the most extreme remedial order that it has ever
issued. The structural injunction that the Court upheld called for the early release of a shockingly large
number of California inmates. Beyond the practical implications of the order, the Court in Plata clearly
signaled that structural injunctions in prison reform litigation remain a valid exercise of judicial power.
Even more, the Court may have signaled an expansion of the scope of the structural injunction remedy
by focusing on the potential, rather than the actual, constitutional deficiencies in the California prison
system. The Court reached its conclusion, moreover, despite a congressional statute that was aimed at
preventing precisely this type of judicial decision-making in this context; the Court ultimately pushed
back on the PLRA in an effort to reaffirm its own broad equitable powers.").
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in Brown described the rights violations attendant to the prison system as "rarely
susceptible of simple or straightforward solutions. In addition to overcrowding the
failure of California's prisons to provide adequate medical and mental health care
may be ascribed to chronic and worsening budget shortfalls, a lack ofpolitical will
in favor of reform, inadequatefacilities, and systemic administrativefailures."114
The Court also used the political failure to remedy the systemic violations
as further support for judicial intervention. "The Court cannot ignore the political
and fiscal reality behind this case. California's Legislature has not been willing or
able to allocate the resources necessary to meet this crisis . . . There is no reason to
believe it will begin to do so now, when the State of California is facing an
unprecedented budgetary shortfall.""' The obvious similarities between the
structural nature of the violations at issue in the California prison system and the
indigent defense crisis compel the conclusion that rampant Sixth Amendment
violations might also be addressed through sweeping injunctive orders.
While structural reform litigation on the scale of that at issue in Brown v.
Plata will without a doubt encounter vehement opposition as violating separation
of powers, federalism, comity, and judicial restraint, those concerns may not be
sufficient to stymie the approach. At least one federal district court decision
ordering fairly extensive affirmative injunctive relief against a municipal public
defender system has already cited Brown to establish the extent of the district
court's equitable authority. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon1 16 involved the public
defense system utilized by the cities of Burlington and Mount Vernon,
Washington. The cities' municipal court systems relied on a traditional public
defender's office as well as privately contracted, appointed defense counsel.1 17 The
district court found that inappropriately low funding and understaffing of private
appointed counsel created a system which "amounted to little more than a 'meet
and plead' system." 1
Plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the system as a whole, and alleged
that it directly and foreseeably resulted in the violation of criminal defendants'
rights under the Sixth Amendment.1 1 9 Consistent with the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Brown v. Plata, the court focused not only on the actual
representational inadequacies experienced by plaintiff class members, but also on
the potential and conceivable violations that were likely to occur as result of the
dysfunctional system.120 The court ruled that the endemic Sixth Amendment
violations were the foreseeable result of policy choices made by city officials.1 2 1

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
plaintiff
ultimate

Brown, 563 U.S. at 525 (emphasis added).
Id. at 530.
Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
Id at 1124-25.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1127 ("The Court does not dispute the fact that many, if not the vast majority, of the
class obtained a reasonable resolution of the charges against them. The problem is not the
disposition: if plaintiffs were alleging that counsel had affirmatively erred and obtained a
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Applying the controlling Ninth Circuit standard, the court ruled that
Plaintiffs had demonstrated that they were subjected to irreparable injury and that
other adequate legal remedies were unavailable, thus entitling the class to
injunctive relief.122 Citing Brown for the court's duty to enforce the constitutional
rights of all persons and the extent of the court's equitable powers, the court
entered an extensive and detailed injunction requiring, among other things, that the
cities reevaluate their indigent defense provision contracts, hire additional
supervisory staff, comply with a rigorously detailed supervision schedule, and
submit numerous, frequent, and detailed performance reports to the court at regular
intervals. 2 3 While the relief ordered in Wilbur is closer to the scale of the relief
ordered in some pre-Brown affirmative injunction cases dealing with indigent
defense systems, than it is to the scale of Brown itself, the district court displayed
few qualms with ordering significant and costly reforms of the municipal indigent
defense systems upon a finding of systemic rights violations. 12 4

XI.

YOUNGER ABSTENTION PRESENTS OBSTACLES

Despite the broad inherent equitable power of federal courts apparent in
Brown, other doctrines may present serious obstacles for the structural injunction
reform approach. Specifically, the abstention doctrine announced in the Supreme
Court's seminal decision, Younger v. Harris,125 may prevent federal courts from
enforcing structural reform orders if that enforcement would result in federal
interference with pending state court criminal prosecutions. The Court in Younger
held, "a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to
the institution of the federal suit except in very unusual situations, where necessary
to prevent immediate irreparable injury." 126 Justice Black described the
constitutional underpinnings of Younger abstention:
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from
interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even
more vital consideration, the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper
respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government

deleterious result, the Sixth Amendment challenge would have been brought under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), rather than Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The point here is that the system is broken to such an
extent that confidential attorney/client communications are rare, the individual defendant is not
represented in any meaningful way, and actual innocence could conceivably go unnoticed and
unchampioned.").
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1133 (citing Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1318 (9th Cir. 1988)).
123. Id. at 1134-37.
124. See id
125. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
126. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971) (describing the Court's holding in Younger).
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will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This,
perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is
referred to by many as 'Our Federalism.' 127
Despite the existence of cases like Wilbur, Younger concerns remain an everpresent feature of any attempt to force federal intervention into state court criminal
prosecutions.
Recently, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana dismissed a class action suit challenging the constitutional adequacy of
certain practices of the Orleans Parish Public Defender "as a matter of federalism
and comity." 1 28 Likely in anticipation of the enforcement problems presented by
Younger and its progeny, the original iteration of the Plaintiffs' complaint
exclusively sought declaratory relief,129 though injunctive claims were added in
their amended complaint and in their second amended complaint.130
Despite Plaintiffs' attempts to limit the relief requested, the court
concluded that "Plaintiffs [had] clearly requested relief which would inevitably
cause [the] Court to violate comity and federalism principles." 13 1 The Court placed
particular emphasis on its inability to remedy violations of even limited injunctive
and declaratory orders without impermissibly interfering with Louisiana's state
courts. 13 2 The court soundly rejected its ability to engage in the type of ongoing
supervision like that entertained in Brown, explaining, "[a]ny declaratory judgment
or injunction entered by this Court would inevitably lead it to become the overseer
of the Orleans Parish criminal court system, a result explicitly condemned by the
United States Supreme Court in Younger. . . ." 133 Despite the district court's

127. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
128. Yarls v. Bunton, NO. 16-31-JJB-RLB, 2017 WL 424874, at *7 (M.D. La. Jan. 31, 2017).
129. Class Action Complaint at 15-16, Yarls, NO. 16-31-JJB-RLB, 2016 WL 212997.
130. Amended Class Action Complaint at 14-15, Yarls, NO. 16-31-JJB-RLB, 2016 WL 4061657;
Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 16-18, Yarls, NO. 16-31-JJB-RLB, 2016 WL 4975341;
see Yarls, 2017 WL 424874 at *6.
131. Yarls, 2017 WL 424874 at *6.
132. Id. ("On its face, an injunction that requires the Defendants to 'implement a plan' to provide
the class with competent counsel may seem innocuous enough, but, what would happen if the
Defendants failed to implement the plan? Would this Court have to order attorneys for certain
indigents? To what extent would this Court be encroaching upon the role of the state judges in
individual prosecutions? What would happen if inconsistent orders were issued? What if the Defendants
were nominally complying with the order by assigning counsel to indigents but those attorneys were not
'competent?' Would the Court have to make a 'competence' determination pretrial? Would a class
member be able to enforce the injunction and find that counsel was ineffective at the pretrial stage
thereby circumventing the post-conviction habeas process? What if Defendants still refused to comply?
Would this Court order the state courts to release the incarcerated members who were still on the
waitlist? The Court declines to issue injunctive relief because it will inevitably lead this Court to engage
in an ongoing audit of the criminal cases in Orleans Parish.").
133. Id. at *3.
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finding that "[i]t is clear that the Louisiana legislature is failing miserably at
upholding its obligations under Gideon," it dismissed the case. 13 4
XII. CONCLUSION
The ongoing failure of our legal system to provide constitutionally
adequate indigent services has rightfully been recognized as a national
embarrassment. Fortunately, the crisis is receiving the attention of dedicated
advocates, and academic and legal scholars have continued to look for new
approaches to remedy the rampant violations of the constitutional rights of the
impoverished accused. This comment has reviewed a few the potential solutions
frequently touted as the best way forward. However, as Gideon continues to age,
the necessity of an impactful judicial remedy becomes more glaring, even if that
remedy might be controversial in its doctrinal origins, scope, and role in our
system of government. Structural reform litigation seeking expansive injunctive
orders may have the very real potential to begin addressing the indigent defense
crisis today. The Supreme Court has demonstrated that our nation's courts may
order our constitutionally defective institutions to fall into line. If the structural
injunction can be reconciled with our system of federalism and the limited power
of federal courts, and does in fact undergo a modern resurgence, perhaps we will
see Gideon's promise fulfilled after all.

134. Id. at *7.
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